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I. Introduction
On December 14, 1995, in Paris, France, parties to The Dayton
Accords ushered in a segregated constitutional system for the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' Under the newly drafted
Constitution, the Presidency and the Parliamentary Assembly's
House of Peoples were reserved for members of the Bosniak, Serb,
and Croat minorities.2 The reserved seats were meant to ensure a
balance among the three ethnic groups after years of interethnic
conflict. Now, nearly fifteen years later, that same constitutional
tLindsey E. Wakely, J.D. expected, May 2011, University of North Carolina School of
Law.
I Sejdid v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4 (Jan. 22,
2009), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-andherzegovinia/grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf.
2 Marko Milanovic, Grand Chamber Judgment in Sejdid and Finci v. Bosnia,
ELIJ: TALK! (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/grand-chamber-judgment-in-sejdicand-finci-v-bosnia/.

3

See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 83 (2010).
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system, while preserving the peace, has prevented a generation of
Balkan citizens of Jewish, Roma, and "other" origins who do not
identify as Bosniak, Serb, or Croat, from influencing their
country's national affairs."
This disenfranchisement led Dervo Sejdid and Jakob Finci to
apply to the European Court of Human Rights for relief under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("the European Convention").' In their
application, Sejdid and Finci challenged "their ineligibility to
stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. .. .. "6 In a 14-3 decision, the European
Court of Human Rights found that the applicants' rights were
violated under Article 14 of the European Convention' and Article
1 of Protocol 12.8 Protocol 12, first adopted in 2000, added a new
article to the European Convention generally prohibiting
discrimination.9 The holding in Sejdid is the first instance in
which the European Court of Human Rights found discrimination
under Article 1 of Protocol 12 since it was enacted in 2005.10
Supporting commentators interpret the Court's ruling as sending a
strong message that "discrimination is repugnant . .. and [that] the

Court would simply not set any precedent that could justify such
inequality in some vaguely defined exceptional circumstances.""
Critics of the decision have echoed the dissenting opinion, arguing
that the constitutional provisions were not created arbitrarily, and
the imperfect balance was necessary to prevent destabilization in a
region wrought with conflict.12
4 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1.
5 Id. See generally COUNCtL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 20 (1995) (describing the articles under Protocal 12).

6 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1.
7 CoUNCnL OF EUROPE, supra note 5, at 20.
8 Milanovic, supra note 2.
9 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Apr. 11, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177 [hereinafter Protocol
No. 12].

10 Milanovic, supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 Sejdi6 v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 53 (Jan.
22, 2009), availableat http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-andherzegovinia/grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf.
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This piece will review the historical development of the
European Court of Human Right's six-step analysis of
discrimination under Article 14." It will also evaluate how the
Sejdid Court narrowed the requirement of proportionality and
further limited the margin of appreciation granted to States.14 The
Court's holding continues the Court's trend towards elimination of
"discriminatory and coercive" policies." Furthermore, this piece
will review the Court's decision to incorporate the tests previously
administered under Article 14 into the analysis under Article 1 of
Protocol 12, and the ramifications for future Protocol 12
ratification. Though in force since 2005, Protocol 12 has yet to be
signed and ratified by a number of major European powers.16
II. Statement of the Case
The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as adopted in
1995, distinguishes between "constituent peoples" and "others."l 7
Self-identified Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are considered
"constituent peoples" while all other ethnic minorities and persons
"who do not declare affiliation with any particular group because
of intermarriage, mixed parenthood, or other reasons," are
considered "others." " The country itself is divided into two
entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the
Federation") and the Republika Srpska.1 9 The federal government
13 Id. See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms art. 14, Apr. 11, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5. [hereinafter 1950 European
Convention].
14 Aalt Willem Heringa & Fried van Hoof, Prohibition of Discrimination, in
THEORY & PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1027, 1043
(Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., Intersentia 4d ed. 2006).
15 CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER & MATTHIAS JESTAEDT, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 29 (1994).
16 See Protocol No. 12 to the Conventionfor the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, Signatory Status, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Oct. 2, 2010),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=1&DF=10/02
/2010&CL=ENG [hereinafter Protocol No. 12 Signatory Status].
17 CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA pmbl.

18

Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 53.

19 BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, BackgroundNote: Bosnia and
Herzegovina, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (June 3, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2868.htm. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is the result of a 1994 agreement between Bosnia's two major ethnic groups: the Muslim
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina is governed by a bicameral
parliamentary assembly, presidency, and constitutional court. 20
The forty-two members of the House of Representatives are
directly elected with two-thirds of members stemming from the
Federation and one-third from the Republika Srpska.2 1 Members
of the much smaller Bosnian House of Peoples are not elected, but
are appointed by the Federation 2 2 and the Republika Srpska. 23 The
Constitution specifies that five Croats and five Bosniaks must be
appointed by the Federation and that five Serbs must be appointed
by the Republika Srpska. 24 A similar ethnicity requirement is
imposed on candidates for the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Presidency. 25 The Office of the Presidency is divided among three
individuals: "one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected
from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected
from the territory of the Republika Srpska." 26 The Presidency
retains the power to conduct foreign policy, execute decisions of
the Parliamentary Assembly, propose the national budget, and
coordinate with international and nongovernmental organizations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.27
Prior to filing their application with the Court, Dervo Sejdid
and Jakob Finci had both served in prominent government
positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.2 8 Sejdid, who identifies as
Roma, served as a representative to the Roma Council of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.2 Finci, who identifies as Jewish, is the former
head of the State Civil Service Agency and current Ambassador to
Bosniaks and Croats. Id.
20 Id.

Id.
22 Sejdid, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5. Delegates from the Federation are appointed by
the House of Peoples of the Federation; in turn, members of the House of Peoples are
appointed by the Cantonal Parliaments. Id.
23 Id. Elected representatives of The National Assembly appoint delegates from the
Republika Srpska. Id.
21

24 CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA art. IV,

25 Id. art. V,

§

2.

§ 1.

26 Id.

27 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7.
28 See id. at 9.
29 Id. The Roma Council is the highest representative body of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Roma community. Id.
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Switzerland.31 Since neither Sejdi6 nor Finci self-identifies as
Bosniak, Croat, or Serb, the Court found both "ineligible to stand
for election to the House of Peoples . . . and the Presidency."3 '
Article 14 of the European Convention states that "the rights
and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status." 32 The limited applicability of Article 14 prohibits
discrimination only in regards to those rights explicitly articulated
in the Convention. Discrimination outside the scope of the
Convention is not directly prohibited. 3
Sejdid and Finci alleged that the discrimination they
experienced was within the scope of the European Convention
because the discrimination touched on their rights under Article 3
of Protocol 1, which states that ratifying parties must "undertake
to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of
the people in the choice of the legislature." 34 Article 3 has not yet
been found to require free election to both chambers in a
bicameral system.3 ' The Court considers the powers held by the
chamber at issue in determining Article 3 applicability. 3 ' The
House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina was found to have
retained broad legislative authority. 3 The Court noted that
bicameral passage is required for legislation addressing: (1)
revenue collection, (2) state spending, and (3) treaty ratification.
Given the scope of the lawmaking authority granted to the body,
the Court held that "[e]lections to the House of Peoples ... falls

Id.
31 Id. Finci received confirmation of his ineligibility in 2007. Id.
32 1950 European Convention, supra note 13.
30

Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1029.
34 Protocol No. I to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S 262 [hereinafter Protocol No.
1].
35 Sejdid, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
33

36 Id.

37 Id.
38 Id.
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within the scope" of Article 3.39
According to the Court, "discrimination means treating
differently, without an objective and reasonable justification,
persons in similar situations."4 0 The presence of an "objective and
reasonable justification" depends upon whether or not
discrimination "pursue[s] a 'legitimate aim,"' and has "a
'reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised. ..."'41 As noted by
the Court, the provision in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Constitution
limiting appointments to the House of Peoples to Bosniaks,
Croats, and Serbs (constituent peoples) was defended by the State
as necessary for "the restoration of peace": 42
When the impugned constitutional provisions were put in
place a very fragile cease-fire was in effect on the ground.
The provisions were designed to end a brutal conflict
marked by genocide and "ethnic cleansing." The nature of
the conflict was such that the approval of the "constituent
peoples" (namely, the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) was
necessary to ensure peace. This could explain, without
necessarily justifying, the absence of representatives of the
other communities (such as local Roma and Jewish
communities) at the peace negotiations and the
participants' preoccupation with effective equality between
the "constituent peoples" in the post-conflict society.43
While the Court gave some recognition to this argument," the
Court nonetheless concluded the applicants' continued ineligibility
to the House of Peoples "lacks an objective and reasonable
justification and has therefore breached Article 14 taken in
conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1."45 According to the
Court, there was not "a 'reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be

Id.
Id. at 32
41 Sejdid, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32 (citing Andrejeva v. Latvia (No. 55707/00)
2009-Eur. Ct. H.R., availableat http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a654aa2.html).
42 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33.
39

40

43 Id.
44 Id.
45

Id. at 34.
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realised ....
As stated earlier, Article 14 does not prohibit all
discrimination, only discrimination within the rights articulated by
the Convention. ' There is no provision of the European
Convention similar to Article 3 of Protocol No. I that addresses a
vote for the executive branch.48 Therefore, Article 14 does not
prohibit any discrimination in regards to elections for the
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 49 Article 1 of Protocol
No. 12 was proposed and ratified to provide broader protection for
European citizens,o by prohibiting discrimination "by any public
authority on any ground. . . ."" The applicants alleged that they

were subject to discrimination under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12
when they were denied the right to be appointed to the Presidency
under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 2
The Court determined that, "[n]otwithstanding the difference
in scope between [Article 14 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12], the
meaning of [discrimination] in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 was
intended to be identical to that in Article 14."" According to the
46 Id. at 32 (citing Andrejeva v. Latvia (No. 55707/00) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R.,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49a654aa2.html).
47 Heringa & van Hoof, supranote 14, at 1029.
48 See 1950 European Convention, supra note 13.
49 See Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1029.
50 See Fried van Hoof, GeneralProhibitionofDiscrimination (Article 1 ofProtocol
No. 12), in THEORY & PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 989

(Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., Intersentia 4d ed. 2006). Article 14 cannot be invoked in
areas of social life like housing and employment law. Id. at 990. The Explanatory
Report on Protocol 12 emphasizes the need to introduce a "general substantive equality
and non-discrimination clause." Id. It is important to note, however, that Article 1 of
Protocol No. 12 is not meant to serve as a replacement to Article 14, only a supplement
to the already existing limitations under Article 14. FRANCIS JACOBS & ROBIN WHITE,
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 359 (Clare Ovey & Robin C.A. White eds.,

Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2002).
51 Protocol No. 12, supra note 9, art. 1(2).
52 Sejdid v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 35,
available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-and-herzegovinial
grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf.
53 Id. (citing Explanatory Report to Protocol 12 § 18). It has been suggested that the
drafters of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 intended to incorporate both the definition of
discrimination promulgated under Article 14 of the European Convention along with the
body of case law developed under Article 14 since the ratification of the European
Convention. See van Hoof, supra note 50, at 990.
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Court, the requirement that an individual declare affiliation with a
"constituent people[s]" in order to be eligible for the Presidency
violates the ban on discrimination under Article 1 of Protocol No.
12.54

III. The Development of Article 14 Jurisprudence
The overall body of case law on Article 14 is limited because
of the Court's frequent reluctance to address possible violations of
the provision. 5 When facing a claimed violation of both Article
14 and another substantive provision, the Court traditionally
addresses the non-Article 14 provision first. The Court will only
address Article 14 if no other violation exists.5 6 As a result, the
Court has not specifically analyzed many instances in which a
violation may have been present under Article 14.
The Court moves through a two-part analysis in Article 14
cases.5 1 In the first part of the analysis, the Court begins by
considering: (1) whether the complaint falls within the sphere of a
protected right as enumerated by the Convention; (2) whether
there is a violation of a substantial provision; and (3) whether
there is differential treatment.5 9 The European Convention does
not ban all forms of disparate treatment."o The burden is on the
applicant to show6 1 that the State "treats differently persons in
analogous situations without providing an objective and
reasonable justification." 62 In the second part of the analysis, the
Court focuses on the purpose of the disparate treatment: (1)
whether the treatment pursues a legitimate aim; (2) whether the
means employed are proportionate to the legitimate aim; and (3)
whether the difference in treatment goes beyond a state's margin
of appreciation.6 The Court has traditionally allowed the State

54 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35.
55 Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 103 1.
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 50, at 352.
59 Id.

60 Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1035.
61 JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 50, at 355.

62 Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1036.
63 JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 50, at 352.

The margin allowed may vary
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leeway in balancing (or appreciating) the public interest against
the interest of affected individuals.' However, the burden is on
the State to show a reasonable and objective justification."
An early analysis of Article 14 appeared in what is commonly
referred to as the Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252
In 1963, Belgium was divided into four linguistic
(1968).
regions." Only the predominant language of the region was taught
In
in area public schools." Brussels was the only exception.
Brussels, children were taught in either Dutch or French,
depending on their native language.69 Children graduating from
private schools that taught languages other than the predominant
language of the region were awarded only a "non-homologated
degree,"
which limited educational opportunities
after
7
0
graduation. Students from these schools desiring a homologated
degree could only obtain one after further examination." The
parents of French-speaking children living predominantly in the
Dutch region filed an application with the European Court of
Human Rights on behalf of their families and the families of over
800 affected children.72 French-speaking parents alleged that the
law required them to either have their children instructed in Dutch,
or send them to far-away schools in Brussels or in the francophone
schooling region.73 The applicants alleged that the discrimination
impacted the "right to education" under Article 2 of Protocol No. I

depending on the nature of the government action. States are likely to be granted a
greater margin of appreciation in economic regulation than regulations affecting essential
freedoms and rights. Heringa & van Hoof, supranote 14, at 1045.
64 Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1043.
65 Id. at 1044.
66 HILLGRUBER & JESTAEDT, supra note 15, at 24.
67

Id.

68 Id.

Id.
70 See Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium (Belgian Linguistics Case), 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252, 264 (1968)
(explaining the extra requirements to obtain a legally recognized degree). See also
69

HILLGRUBER & JESTAEDT, supra note 15, at 24. No subsidies were permitted to parents

who preferred to send their children to regional private schools. Id. at 23.
71 Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 259.
72 See id at 259.
73 See id.
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of the European Convention.7 4
The Court found no right to a particular kind of education
establishment under the Convention, but did find that a State could
not discriminate in the entrance requirements for an education
establishment under Article 14." The Court noted that equality is
violated "if the distinction has no objective and reasonable
justification."76 However, the Court adopted a liberal view of
what qualified as "objective and reasonable justification," stating
that factual features and the character of a particular society cannot
be disregarded."
In the Belgian Linguistics Case, the State was not shy in
asserting its intention to promulgate a Dutch-speaking majority."
The goal of the Belgian government was "to rehabilitate 'Flemish
language and Flemish culture' by developing an 'intelligentsia
with a good knowledge of Dutch,' able to play a formative r6le
and, in a more general sense, to give to the country a stable
structure based mainly on two large homogeneous regions and a
bilingual capital.""
The State's argument was accepted as an objective and
reasonable justification. The Court held that the linguistic
divisions were not "so disproportionate to the requirements of the
public interest" as to constitute impermissible discrimination
under Article 14.80

In his dissent in the Belgian Linguistics Case, Judge Terje
Wold disagreed with the majority's approach of looking at the
State's internal dynamics: "The right to education must have
exactly the same content in Belgium as in Norway or in Turkey
and all the other states which have ratified the Convention."81
Judge Wold suggested that it would "be a very dangerous road to
embark upon if the articles of the Convention were to be

74 See id. at 296.
75 See id. at 283.
76

Id. at 284.

77

Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 284.
See HILLGRUBER & JESTAEDT, supranote 15, at 29.

78

79 Belgian Linguistics Case, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 288. The legislation "succeeded in
its attempt to exorcise 'the grave national crises' caused by 'Flemish separatism."' Id.
80 See id. at 294.
81 Id. at 351.
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interpreted in such a way as to allow the member States to regulate
the Convention's ascribed human rights 'according to the needs
and resources of the community."' 82
In policing the legitimate aim and margin of appreciation, the
Court in the Belgian Linguistics Case evinced a willingness to
grant significant discretion to the State. Since the Belgian
Linguistic Case, the body of case law has shifted towards less
discretion. In the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v.
The United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1985), several
female applicants who lawfully and permanently settled in the
United Kingdom challenged a provision under the United
Kingdom's immigration law that permitted the wives and female
fiancdes of settled entrants to attain indefinite leave to enter, but
limited the entrance of husbands and male fianc6s." The law also
distinguished between women born in the United Kingdom and
women born abroad.8 4 Women who were born in the United
Kingdom or who had a parent born in the United Kingdom did not
have the same restriction and could have their non-national
husband accepted for settlement.
The applicants claimed "unjustified
differences
of
treatment ... based on sex, race and also - in the case of [one
applicant] - birth. . . ."" The United Kingdom alleged that the

aim of the legislation was to protect "the domestic labour market
at a time of high unemployment by curtailing ... immigration by
someone who could be expected to seek full-time work in order to
support a family."8
The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the
allegations of racial discrimination given that the legislation did
not structure the requirements for indefinite leave to enter to
consider the race of the applicant." In regards to the United
Kingdom's policy to treat female entrants differently than male
entrants, the Court held that while "States enjoy a certain 'margin
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Abdulaziz v. The United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 10 (1985).
See id. at 15.
See id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 40.
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of appreciation' in assessing whether and to what extent
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different
treatment, the scope of this margin will vary according to the
circumstances . . . ."8 9 The fact that the disparate treatment was
based on the sex of the applicant carried weight with the Court. 90
A narrow margin of appreciation was granted because the Court
viewed gender equality as an important aspiration of the Council
of Europe.91
The Court did not accept the State's argument that immigrant
husbands had a greater impact on the United Kingdom's labor
market than immigrant wives and rejected the relevance of data
suggesting that men of working age are more "economically
active" than women of working age. 92 The Court questioned
whether greater economic activity (employment, self-employment,
or active pursuit of employment) among men as a whole translated
into immigrant husbands having a greater impact on the labor
market than immigrant wives. 93 In particular, the Court noted that
immigrant wives vastly outnumbered immigrant men. 94 The Court
did find the State's aim-protecting the domestic labor marketlegitimate,95 but rejected the State's argument that gender based
discrimination was necessary to justify the aim. 96
The husband of applicant Sohair Balkandali, a divorc6e who
received her lawful residency through a prior marriage, was also
denied permission to remain in the United Kingdom because
neither Mrs. Balkandali nor her parents were born in the United
Kingdom. 9 The State argued that women born in the United
Kingdom, or daughters of individuals born in the United
Kingdom, are entitled to greater protection because these women
would suffer greater hardship if forced to move abroad to reside

89 Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 37.
90

See Heringa & van Hoof, supranote 14, at 1047.

9I See id.

92 Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 38.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 37.
96 Id.

97 See id. at 27-28.
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with their husbands than women with lesser ties to the country.9 8
The Court gave credit to this argument, finding that there are
"general persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to
those whose link with a country stems from birth within it."" The
Court found that the disparate treatment had an "objective and
reasonable justification" proportional to the legitimate aim of the
State."oo Therefore, there was no discrimination under Article 14
in regards to the applicant's nation of origin.
Demonstrating some similarity to Sejdid and Finci's
application in Aziz v. Cyprus, (No. 69949/01), 2004-Eur.Ct. H.R.
2, a resident of Cyprus challenged a constitutional provision that
segregated the Turkish and Greek Communities on two different
electoral rolls.'o' Under Article 62 of the Cypriot Constitution,
seventy percent of House seats were allocated to the Greek
community, and thirty percent to the Turkish community. 102
Members of the Turkish community could not vote for candidates
for the Greek seats, and members of the Greek community could
not vote for candidates for the Turkish seats.'03 Subsequently,
Turkish representatives withdrew from the government and
formed their own administrative state, the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus, on the northern portion of the island.1" The
applicant was a member of the small Turkish community
remaining in Cypriot-controlled territory. 0 5
Article 31 of the Cypriot Constitution, in conflict with Article
62, said that "[e]very citizen has ... the right to vote in any
election held under this Constitution or any such law."l 06 The
applicant alleged that the suspension of Turkish participation in
parliament voided Article 62 and deprived the applicant of any
opportunity to elect members of the Cyprus House of

98 Abdulaziz, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41.
99 Id.
100 Id.

101 Aziz v. Cyprus (No. 69949/01), 2004-Eur.Ct. H.R. 2.
102 Id. at 6.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.

106 Aziz, 2004-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3.
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Representatives.o 7 Similar to Sejdid, the applicant challenged the
constitutional limitations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1L.'o The
Court vigorously agreed that the applicant's disparate treatment
"resulted from the very fact that the applicant was a Turkish
Cypriot."1 09
The Cypriot government asserted that there was no violation of
Article 14 because "the applicant was not in a comparable
situation to voters who were members of the Greek community
and voted in this capacity for the candidates from their
community," (emphasis added)."o This argument was rejected by
the Court for failure to justify the "difference on reasonable and
objective grounds.""' The Court placed particular emphasis on
the fact that under existing conditions, members of applicant's
minority community were "prevented from voting at any
parliamentary election.""12 The Court determined that the unequal
access of the Turkish Cypriot community to the electoral rolls
violated Article 14 of the Convention." 3

IV. Argument
A. Advancing the European Court ofHuman Rights Analysis
ofArticle 14
1. Proportionality
As noted in the opinion in Sejdid, the presence of an "objective
and reasonable justification" depends upon whether discrimination
"pursue[s] a 'legitimate aim,"' and has "a 'reasonable relationship
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised...

."'114

The Court concluded that the

applicant's continued ineligibility to the House of Peoples "lacks
Id. at 5.
Protocol No. 1, supranote 34, art. 3.
109 Aziz, 2004-Eur.Ct. H.R. at 10.
107
108

110 Id. at 9.
11' Id. at 10.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 11.
114 Sejdid v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 33,
availableat http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-and-herzegovinia/
grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf.
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an objective and reasonable justification and has therefore
breached Article 14.""' The Court did not analyze whether or not
a legitimate aim existed; rather, the Court found no "objective and
reasonable justification" based on a lack of proportionality." 6 The
Court found a lack of proportionality based on: (1) the positive
developments made towards peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
since The Dayton Accords; (2) the Court's belief that powersharing can be achieved in such a way as to also include
disenfranchised "others"; and (3) Bosnia and Herzegovina's own
commitment to reform pursuant to their E.U. ascension." 7
The strict stance on proportionality in this case shows that the
Court is requiring a narrow relationship between the policy and the
aim sought to be realized." 8 The Court has not always required
such a narrow relationship; in the Belgian Linguistics Case, the
Court permitted Belgium to engage in what the State admitted was
a "discriminatory and coercive" policy aimed at encouraging
linguistic conformity. "' The Court found Belgium's unequal
treatment of francophone citizens not so "disproportionate to the
requirements of the public interest" as to constitute impermissible

discrimination.120
The existence of "alternatives" materialized as an important
factor to the Court's decision in Sejdi.'12' According to the Court,
"there exist mechanisms of power-sharing which do not
automatically lead to the total exclusion of representatives of the
other communities ... the possibility of alternative means
achieving the same end is an important factor in this
sphere .... "

22

The Court did not similarly consider alternative

policies to achieve linguistic conformity in the Belgian Linguistics
Case.123 It is possible that the State could have achieved its goals
through alternative means that may not have resulted in

'15 Id. at 34.
116

Id. at 33.

117 Id.at 33-34.
118

Id. at 32.

119 HILLGRUBER & JESTAEDT, supra note 15, at 28.
120
121

Id. at 27.
Sejdi, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 34.

122 Id.
123

Id. at 28.
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differential treatment of regional linguistic minorities, but it was
not required by the Court to do so.124
In Abdulaziz, the Court rejected the disparate treatment of
women seeking to have their husbands lawfully and permanently
settled in the United Kingdom because it was "disproportionate to
the purported aims." 25 The State argued that immigrant husbands
had a greater impact on the United Kingdom's labor market than
immigrant wives, and thus limitations on their entrance were
reasonably justified.126 In effect, discrimination in immigration
policy was justified because of economics.127 The gap between
means and ends was not so great in Sejdi6; ethnic preferences were
justified to prevent ethnic conflict.128 However, important factors
existed in Sejdid that did not exist in Abdulaziz, for example, the
existence of other international commitments to end the existing
discrimination. 129 This may suggest that there is not such a
marked change between the Court's view of proportionality in
Sejdid and Abdulaziz.
the Court recognized that the constitutional
In Sejdi,
provisions were put in place "to end a brutal conflict,"' yet the
Court still held that the applicants' continued ineligibility "lacks
One other
an objective and reasonable justification . . ." "'
possible distinguishing characteristic between Sejdi6 and the
earlier described cases is duration of the differential treatment.
The Court's decision regarding proportionality hinges, in part, on
the "significant positive developments in Bosnia and
Herzegovina" 132 through recognition that "progress might not
always have been consistent and challenges remain."' 3 3 Since
signing The Dayton Accords, conflicting ethnic groups had
"surrendered their control over the armed forces . . . and Bosnia

See id. at 28-31.
Abdulaziz v. The United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 38 (1985).
126 Id. at 36.
127 Id. at 37.
128 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 34.
132 Id. at 33.
133 Id.
124
125
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and Herzegovina joined NATO's Partnership for Peace;" and that
progress has been made in advancing Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
candidate for EU membership. 13 4 Furthermore, the Court noted
that Bosnia and Herzegovina's State Constitution had been
amended on a previous occasion."' In effect, there had been time
for progress, and progress had occurred.13 6 At the time of the
Court's decision, nearly fifteen years had passed since the signing
of The Dayton Accords."' Time appeared equally important in
Aziz: Special attention was paid to the fact that particular
conditions were the byproduct of thirty years of deterioration and
that the applicant had not been able to vote in a country where he
had "always lived.""'
2. The Margin ofAppreciation
"In general, the Court leaves a wide margin of appreciation to
the national authorities in appreciating the weight of the public
interest concerned as compared with the individual interests at
stake." "' The theoretical margin of appreciation assisted the
Court in upholding State policy in the Belgian Linguistics Case
and the United Kingdom's regulations based on national origin in
Abdulaziz. 140 However, it appears that the same margin of
appreciation did not apply in Sejdid because of the suspect
classification.' 4 ' The Sejdi6 Court held that "where a difference in
treatment is based on race or ethnicity, the notion of objective and
reasonable justification must be interpreted as strictly as
The Court's view that racial and ethnic
possible." 142
classifications require "special vigilance and a vigorous reaction"
suggests that a margin of appreciation cannot be applied. 143

134 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33.
135 Id.
136 Id.
'37 Id.

See Aziz v. Cyprus (No. 69949/01), 2004-Eur.Ct. H.R. 8.
Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1043.
140 Id. at 1047.
141 Sejdi, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32 (suggesting that ethnicity and race are related
concepts and that both suffice as suspect classifications requiring additional scrutiny).
138

139

142 Id.
143 See id.
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Divisions based on race or ethnicity "do not need a simple
justification, but 'very weighty reasons."'" This argument is
parallel to the argument regarding gender discrimination in
Abdulaziz.145 In Abdulaziz, a smaller margin was granted because
the Court viewed gender equality as an important aspiration of the
Council of Europe.14 6 Sejdid affirms the Court's rule in Abdulaziz
that suspect classifications will not be extended the same margin
of appreciation as other classifications. 147
Both Sejdie and Aziz addressed ethnicity as a suspect
classification. In Aziz, where the ethnicity of the voter was also at
issue, the State alleged that as a member of the Turkish
community, the applicant was not in a position to vote for a
representative of the Greek community.14 8 Aside from evidence
that this classification was mandated under Article 62 of the
Cypriot Constitution, the State alleged no modem justification for
the discrimination. 149 However, as the dissent in Sejdid notes, the
circumstances in Sejdie were not parallel to Aziz.'5 s The State
argued in Sejdid that the imperfect balance was presently
necessary to prevent destabilization in a region wrought in
conflict. "' In contrast to Aziz, reservation of power for
"constituent people" was argued to be necessary to preserve the
current (relative) peace within a nation still struggling with
"mono-ethnic political parties." 52
The totality of the discrimination could have played an
important role as well in overcoming the suspect classification to
find a margin of appreciation available to the State.' 53 In Aziz, the
Court noted that the "applicant's right to vote, as guaranteed by
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, was impaired."' 4 With a complete

144 Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at 1043.
145 See id. at 1047.
146 Id.

147 See Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32.
148 Aziz v. Cyprus (No. 69949/01), 2004-Eur.Ct. H.R. 11.
149 See id.

150 See Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 32 (Bonello, J., dissenting).
151 Id.

152 Sejdi, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29.
153 See Aziz, 2004-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8-9.
154 Id. at 8.

FROM CONSTITUENT PEOPLES TO CONSTITUENTS

2010]

251

ban on voting for candidates on the Greek electoral roll, and no
Turkish candidates serving in parliament, Turkish Cypriots were
completely disenfranchised from voting for members of the
national legislative body. 1"' As the State tried to distinguish in
Sejdid, Sejdid and Finci's right to vote was not entirely
impaired.1' "Others" in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be openly
elected to serve in the House of Representatives as well as the
other directly elected regional legislative bodies. "' The State
further alleged that the difference in treatment of individuals
appointed to the House of Peoples and the Presidency was
justified in this "particular circumstance.""' This is in contrast to
the general prohibition on voting in Aziz.1 59
B. Defining Article 1 ofProtocol 12 and the Impact on
FutureRatification
Article 1 of Protocol 12 states: "[t]he enjoyment of any right
set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status." 160 The operative
language of Protocol No. 12 addresses any "right set forth by
law"l 61 as opposed to Article 14's assertion of any "rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention." 162 In its expansive
language, Article 1(2) clarifies that "[n]o one shall be
discriminated against by any public authority on any ground." 63
The Protocol was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in
2005.'6 In Sejdid6, the European Court of Human Rights decided
for the first time that the analysis of discrimination under Article 1

155
156

See id.
Id. at 29.

157 Id.

Id.
159 See Aziz, 2004-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29.
160 Protocol No. 12, supra note 9, art. 1.
158

161 Id.
162 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
163 Protocol No. 12, supra note 9, art. 1.
164 See id.
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of Protocol No. 12 would replicate the analysis for Article 14.165
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 has been interpreted as requiring
applicants to show that there is "differential treatment in the
enjoyment of any right set forth in national law."16 6 There is no
indication that Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 distinguishes between
rights under state statutory or constitutional provisions, under
common law, or under international law.167 In finding that Bosnia
and Herzegovina discriminated against Sejdid and Finci in denying
them eligibility to the Presidency, the Court has found
discrimination in a number of government actions outside the
scope of the Convention also to be directly prohibited.'
Through this holding, the Court has sent a clear signal that
discrimination, in particular discrimination based on ethnicity, will
not be tolerated.169 However, the Convention articulates specific
rights to be enjoyed by citizens of contracting states.170 No similar
narrow application exists under the Article 1, Protocol 12
prohibition.1 7 ' Where and when discrimination may be tolerated in
pursuit of a legitimate aim in any governmental lawmaking or
adjudication remains unclear.
To date, twenty states have signed and eighteen have ratified
the Protocol.172 The United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Poland,
Sweden, and Switzerland have all failed to sign and ratify Protocol
12.173 Officials from the United Kingdom have expressed concern

165 Sejdid v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 35,
available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-and-herzegovinia/
grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf (citing Explanatory Report to Protocol 12 § 18).
It has been suggested that the drafters of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 intended to
incorporate both the definition of discrimination promulgated under Article 14 of the
European Convention along with the body of case law developed under Article 14 since
the ratification of the European Convention. See Heringa & van Hoof, supra note 14, at
990.
166 JACOBS & WHiTE, supra note 50, at 359-60.
167 Id.

168 Sejdi6, 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35.
169 See id.
170 European Convention, supra note 162.
171 See Protocol No. 12, supra note 9, art. 1.
172 Protocol No. 12 Signatory Status, supra note 16.
173 See id.
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over the Protocol's failure to specify "rights set forth by law,"' 7 4
and over the failure of the Protocol to address positive measures
that may be used to assist a historically disadvantaged group.' 75
More specifically, the United Kingdom has expressed concern that
Protocol 12:
does not follow the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights in allowing objective and reasonably
justified distinctions. . . . The government recognizes that
under current case law of the European Court of Human
Rights, objective and reasonably justified distinctions do
not constitute discrimination . .. [b]ut it is anxious about
the possibility that the Court's interpretation might evolve,
and it is not bound by previous judgments.'7 1
The Court attempted to address that concern by holding that
"Article 14 does not prohibit Contracting Parties from treating
groups differently in order to correct 'factual inequalities' between
them. Indeed, in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to
correct inequality through different treatment may, without an
objective and reasonable justification, give rise to a breach of that
Article."17 7
V. Conclusion
The Court's holding in Sejdi6 may pose a challenge for
Sejdid dealt
advancing further ratification of Protocol 12.
particularly with Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitution; however,
the Court did not suggest that a different analysis would apply to
legislation passed by national or regional parliaments. This may
serve as a disincentive for the United Kingdom because a question
remains as to the impact on certain ethnic based distinctions
France and
recently codified in other European Countries.
Switzerland have both received international media attention for
policies limiting religious dress in schools, and limiting the new
Sandra Fredman, Why the UK Government Should Sign and Ratify Protocol 12,
1 (2002), http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/protocol12.pdf (describing
whether "rights set forth by law" include international as well as national law).
'75 Id.
176 Id. at 1-2.
177 Sejdi6 v. Bosnia (Nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 2009-Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32,
availableat http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/litigation/bosnia-and-herzegovinial
grand-chamber-judgment-20091222.pdf.
174
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construction of religious institutions. It is unclear how these kinds
of religious or ethnic distinctions, likely subject to strict scrutiny,
might hold up under Article 1 of Protocol 12.
As noted by the Court, the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has been amended once before." 8 Amending the
Constitution to bring it in line with the European Court's holding
will require the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb political blocks to
formulate a new political agreement to balance power.17 It is
unclear if the Court's holding can apply the effective political
pressure that has thus far been lacking-even with the existing EU
accession requirements.'" 0 As a result, ethnic minorities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, while receiving certification of their
mistreatment from the Court, may have an uphill battle in
achieving actual representation within the country. Meanwhile,
Sejdid has advanced existing case law for ethnic minorities-as
well as other minority groups-in favor of prohibiting ethnic
discrimination for all but the rarest of circumstances under the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
The Court's ruling suggests that proportionality will be viewed
narrowly and that the margin or appreciation granted to states to
determine the weight of the public interest will be exceedingly
limited when suspect classes are involved, regardless of the
particular circumstances. Furthermore, the Sejdi6 Court has taken
an important first step in clarifying the practical implications of
Article 1 of Protocol 12. However, future cases will need to
define what circumstances will justify some limited discrimination
in favor of public interest. Regardless, Sejdi6 is likely to play an
important role in expanding electoral rights and political
protections to minority groups living across the European
continent.

Id.
Milanovic, supra note 2.
180 Id. ("Bosnia in many ways still remains profoundly illiberal, and skepticism
should be the default option when it comes to assessing the will and the ability of the
current crop of its political leaders"). Id.
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